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Abstract The craft beer segment in the U.S. has grown from a meager 20 brewers in the 1980s
to over 7,000 today and is approaching a 15% market share. Macrobrewers initially responded by
internal product diﬀerentiation but then began acquiring craft brewers, provoking concerns about the
continuing viability of independent, local brewers. We analyze the economic consequences of the most
prominent of these acquisitions: the Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI) purchase of Goose Island in 2011.
Using variation in pre-acquisition ABI market share to account for the eﬀects of the distribution tier in
the beer industry and the influence of macrobrewers on the distribution tier, we analyze price and
quantity eﬀects in the Midwest and mid-Atlantic states as well as the local region where Goose Island
was founded. We also evaluate the eﬀect on varieties of beer available to consumers in oﬀ-premise
accounts to analyze the eﬀect of ABI’s acquisition on independent, local breweries who must jockey for
shelf space with macrobrewers. By the usual metrics of merger retrospectives, we find large gains in sales
for craft brewers as a result of ABI’s entry by acquisition, possibly the result of marketing spillovers
attracting new consumers to craft beer. We also find large negative eﬀects on product variety, indicating
greater diﬃculty for craft brewers to gain shelf placement in oﬀ-premise accounts. We find that these
eﬀects are most pronounced in Goose Island’s regional birthplace of Illinois.
1 Introduction
In the United States, it has become common for large, established companies to acquire small, innovative
firms. In recent years, Walmart, GM, Ford, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft
and Yahoo together have acquired over 800 such firms. These acquisitions, being small, often are not
publicized outside of trade and industry circles. However, the economic climate that this strategy of
corporate control creates may significantly alter the entry and exit conditions for new entrants and can
shape the product oﬀerings of incumbent firms that make these acquisitions. As Wollmann (2019) points
out, because of their size, many of these acquisitions fall outside the scope of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
For this reason, the antitrust authorities at the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission
might not take notice.
In the malt beverage industry, megabrewers such as Anheuser-Busch InBev (AB InBev or ABI) and
SABMiller (MillerCoors) have acquired a number of craft brewers in the United States. Within beer
industry circles, the acquisition of small, local brewers by large, national brewers is heartening to some
and disheartening to others.1 On the one hand, the prospect of being acquired at a premium valuation can
Kenneth G. Elzinga
University of Virginia, Monroe Hall, Room 216, PO Box 400182, Charlottesville, VA 22904
Alexander J. McGlothlin
University of Kentucky, 550 South Limestone, Lexington, KY 40506
1 According to Noel (2018), after the news of Goose Island’s acquisition by ABI sunk in, friends of craft beer
concluded: “Goose Island was a sellout. Anheuser-Busch was out to destroy craft beer. For twenty years, craft
beer and Big Beer had been mostly parallel lines. The lines had intersected.” (p. 177)
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be attractive to a pioneering craft brewer and induce entry by aspiring entrepreneurs. On the other hand,
consumers who value craft beer for its small business and local ownership appeal worry that acquisitions
of craft brewers by large incumbent brewers will taint the cachet of the craft segment.2 Craft brewers who
go it alone fear that their access to distribution channels will be foreclosed relative to that of the acquired
craft brewers. Testing whether megabrewer-craft brewer combinations have anticompetitive consequences
for independent craft brewers and their customers is the theme of this paper.

2 The Craft Beer Segment: A Brief History
The year 1965 marks the taproot of the craft beer industry in the United States, when Fritz Maytag
assumed ownership of the Anchor Steam Beer Company in San Francisco and pioneered a way forward
for small brewers in the U.S. beer industry (Elzinga et al., 2015). At the time, the beer industry was
highly concentrated and output was largely homogeneous, consisting of lager beer.
While craft beer got its start with Maytag’s entrepreneurial endeavors, the segment was slow to
realize growth and popularity. Only 100 craft brewers existed in 1987. Since that time, there has been an
explosion of new entrants. Over 7,000 craft breweries now operate in the United States. Most of these are
small producers whose individual market share is de minimus (Elzinga et al., 2015). In fact, small-scale is
part of the oﬃcial definition put forth by the Brewers Association, which defines a craft brewer as small,3
independent,4 and, naturally, a brewer5. The growth in the craft segment has several explanations: a
decrease in taxation of craft beer in 1978,6 the expansion of brewpubs after their federal legalization in
1978,7 growth in personal income, and consumer demand for product variety.8,9
The success of the craft beer movement was achieved in part through the product’s diﬀerentiation
compared to the relative homogeneity of the lager beer produced by the major brewers. Over time,
the macrobeer industry evolved into primarily producing a “light beer” (i.e., low calorie) malt beverage
whose popularity allowed the exploitation of scale economies. Today three of the four leading brands of
beer sold in the U.S. are low-calorie beers.10 Craft beer filled a demand gap that opened in part because
of the close proximity in taste, quality, and price of the major brands. The craft industry also possesses
public policy support, exemplified through the recent decrease of the federal excise tax on beer, a feature
of the Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act.11
Consumer demand for beer in the U.S. is supplied largely by ABI and MillerCoors. For some years,
these firms could ignore the craft segment and did. However, in recent years, these firms have embarked on
a wave of acquisitions of craft brewers. Craft brewers now produce over 12% of industry output (Brewers
Association). The arrival of the craft segment is the most important contemporary development in the
domestic beer industry. The interest and importance of craft beer is reflected in a growing literature.12
2 If the cachet of the craft beer is based on locally owned, locally brewed product, the size and geographic
footprint of Boston Beer sits outside both of these metrics. Boston Beer (primary brand, Samuel Adams) had
sales in 2018 of 4.3 million barrels, making it the sixth largest brewer in the United States (Steinman, 2019a).
Jim Koch, the founder of Boston Beer, is a member of the Bloomberg Billionaire group; his stature, and that
of the firm he founded, also does not fit the conventional image of the scrappy craft brewer carving out a
niche in an industry dominated by megabrewers.
3 “Annual production of 6 million barrels of beer or less (approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual sales). Beer
production is attributed to a brewer according to rules of alternating proprietorships.” (Brewer’s Association,
nd)
4 “Less than 25 percent of the craft brewery is owned or controlled (or equivalent economic interest) by
a beverage alcohol industry member that is not itself a craft brewer.” (Brewer’s Association, nd)
5 “Has a TTB Brewer’s Notice and makes beer.” (Brewer’s Association, nd)
6 In 1978, Congress decreased the federal excise tax from $9.00/barrel to $7.00/barrel for the first 60,000
barrels produced by breweries with less than 2 million barrels in total annual sales.
7 While federal law permitted home brewing, legalization at the state level was not completed until 2013 when
the last states, Alabama and Mississippi, legalized home brewing.
8 See Tremblay and Tremblay (2011) and Silberberg (1985).
9 “American beer drinkers discovered variety. Tastes diversified. Anheuser-Busch could no longer simply
suﬀocate competition. It needed craft beer. So it bought Goose Island.” (Noel, p. xi)
10 Bud Light, Coors Light, and Miller Lite.
11
The Craft and Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act (CBMTRA) went into eﬀect January 1, 2018
and will “sunset” on December 31, 2019. Under the bill, the federal excise tax decreased from $7.00/barrel
to $3.50/barrel for the first 60,000 barrels of domestic brewers producing less than 2 million barrels annually
(Brewer’s Association, nd).
12 The best treatments are Acitelli (2013), The Audacity of Hops: The History of Americas Craft Beer
Revolution and Lewis (2014), We Make Beer: Inside the Spirit and Artistry of Americas Craft Brewers. Booklength treatments of individual craft brewers include Beyond the Pale: The Story of Sierra Nevada Brewing
Co. by Grossman (2013) and Beer for Pete's Sake by Slosberg (1998). Steve Hindy, one of the founders of
The Brooklyn Brewery, also has written a history of craft brewers: The Craft Beer Revolution (Hindy, 2014).
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3 Beer Distribution
After Prohibition ended, a three-tier system was mandated in order to prevent the excesses and moral
degradation that purportedly catalyzed the outlawing of alcoholic beverages under Prohibition. Federal
law enabled states to mandate that there should be an independent distributor (i.e., the additional tier)
positioned between the producer tier and the retailer tier. The supposed goal of requiring a third tier
between the brewer and the retailer was to deter promotional strategies and actions on the part of a
vertically integrated brewer-retailer that might stoke the demand for malt beverages in such a way as to
cause alcoholism or alcohol-induced crime.
The result is that many distributors have contracts with major brewers to sell the brewer’s products
exclusively within a certain geographic region. This creates unique incentives for a brewer to structure
contracts to induce the distributor to market its product line as opposed to its competitors’ products
to on-premise retailers (bars), as well as oﬀ-premise retailers (grocery stores, convenience stores, liquor
stores, etc.).
Distributors also may control placement of products within the beer section of a supermarket or
convenience store. As a “category captain,” a distributor may determine what brands are placed next to
each other, and the individual shelf level or cooler door where particular brands are displayed. Within
the industry, shelf placement and shelf space are important marketing variables. For example, eye level
products or products on an aisle endcap are more likely to be seen and bought by consumers. Pricing
and shelf placement strategies may induce substitution towards one brand and away from another.
4 Distribution by the Two Brewers
As of 2016, ABI and MillerCoors sold about 2/3 of all beer in the U.S.13 Because of the existence of only
two major sellers, there usually are only two major distributors in any one geographic area, one for the
brand portfolio of ABI brands and one for the brand portfolio of MillerCoors. These same distributors also
may contract with craft brewers in the area who want access to and distribution in their territory. Until
recently, ABI and MillerCoors did not have a product to challenge craft beers in the market. However,
with the acquisition of several craft breweries by the two dominant brewers, there is now concern among
the craft segment that ABI and MillerCoors will use their influence with distributors to foreclose other
craft brewers from on-premise as well as oﬀ-premise accounts. The National Beer Wholesalers Association
spoke to this in a letter to the Department of Justice regarding the merger between ABI and SABMiller,
noting,
“Through incentive programs to promote ABI beers at the expense of rival brands, influence over
distribution management, substantial control through the equity agreement and by other means to
control independent distributors, the DOJ has found that ABI can inhibit craft and rival brewers
access to the market through ABIs distribution partners (National Beer Wholesalers Association,
2016).”
While the combined ABI and MillerCoors share of market (SOM) is large, it has been in a free-fall
since the start of the twenty-first century. Over the past decade, ABIs volume fell almost 20 million
barrels, almost all of this decrease taking place in ABIs two major brands, Budweiser and Bud Light.
This loss in sales is the equivalent of shuttering four modern breweries. In terms of market share, ABI has
lost approximately eight share points. (Steinman, 2019b). This loss in volume took place notwithstanding
the acquisition of ten craft brewers and the acquisition itself of Anheuser-Busch by InBev.14
While the tailspin at MillerCoors has not matched that of ABI in reduced barrelage, in relative terms
MillerCoors decline has been greater. In the past decade, MillerCoors volume dropped 14.5 million barrels,
the equivalent of three modern breweries. The joint venture of Miller and Coors never experienced a year
in which total sales for the combined firm grew. MillerCoors held a SOM of 30 percent in 2008; in 2018,
the MillerCoors share was just under 24 (Steinman, 2019a). As macrobeer sales have decreased, their
13 Unless

cited otherwise, all figures are from the 2016 Beer Industry Update (Beer Marketer’s Insights, 2016).
During this period, Anheuser-Busch has diversified through acquisition into other potables including tea,
energy drinks, hard seltzer, and even spirits. Recently ABI acquired Cutwater Spirits, a firm founded by
the same team that founded Ballast Point, a craft brewer acquired earlier by ABI. (Steinman, 2019a).
14
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distributors became wary about the future of Big Beer and focused their attention on growth sectors such
as import brands, craft brands, and flavored malt beverages.15 The macrobrewers have taken notice.16
Table 1 shows U.S. share of beer sales by segment, comparing 2018 to 2013. In 2013, Craft SOM
was just under eight share points; Import SOM was just over thirteen. Imports now stand at just over
seventeen; while Craft is just over twelve. Imported beer maintained a consistent segment share lead over
craft beer, the delta between Import and Craft remaining stable at about five share points.
At one time in the U.S., imported beer primarily meant beer from Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands. No more. Table 2 shows the shipments of imported brands in 2018. Constellation’s portfolio of
Mexican brands now has five of the top ten brands being sold in the U.S. Almost all of the growth in
imports is accounted for by sales growth from South of the border. Note the absence of any import beer
among the top ten brands from North of the border. Once prominent Canadian brands in the Molson
and LaBatt portfolio have faded.

5 The Major Brewers and Craft Beer
Prior to the expansion of craft brewers in the United States, the beer industry sustained a dramatic
decrease in the number of producers. The number of conventional lager breweries in the U.S. fell from
421 in 1947 to 20 in 2006, as firms either merged or exited the market (Elzinga et al., 2015). This drop was
the result of economies of scale in production and marketing, which benefitted the large macrobrewers
but pushed most of the medium-sized brewers out of the market (Elzinga (2016), Tremblay and Tremblay
(2011)).
High profile acquisitions and mergers at the top of the international macrobrewer food chain also
have contributed to the diminishing number of conventional breweries. In 2002, South African Breweries
acquired Miller Brewing Company to form SABMiller. In 2005, Molson Brewery of Canada and Coors
Brewing Company merged to form the Molson Coors Brewing Company. In 2008, SABMiller and Molson
Coors formed the joint venture, MillerCoors, for operations in the United States. Also, in 2008, Belgian
brewing firm, InBev, acquired Anheuser-Busch to create Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI).17 ABI engaged in
a Brobdingnagian $107 billion merger with SABMiller in 2016. As a result of that combination, Molson
Coors assumed sole ownership of MillerCoors.
Production of “phantom” craft beer brands was the macrobrewers initial response to the growth of
the craft brewing market.18 In 1988, Miller bought Jacob Leinenkugel Brewing Company, the first such
acquisition. In 1995, Miller also purchased Celis Brewery and a 50% share of Shipyard Brewing. In 2000,
Miller shut down Celis Brewery and sold Shipyard back to the original owners. With the exception of
Leinenkugel, which went on to become part of Miller’s craft and import business development unit, Tenth
and Blake Beer Company, these initial acquisitions were not distinguished by their commercial success.
The real movement of Big Beer companies acquiring craft brewers came a decade later when ABI got
involved.

6 ABI and the Craft Segment
In Barrel-Aged Stout and Selling Out: Goose Island, Anheuser-Busch, and How Craft Beer Became Big
Business, Josh Noel noted “the announcement of Goose Island’s $38.8 million sale to the world’s largest
beer company, on March 28, 2011, functionally ended an era for craft beer-an era of collaboration and
cooperation, growth, and good vibes, and the shared cause of building a lifeboat in a sea of Big Beer
banality.” (Noel, p. xi) Noel added,
15 An

example of a flavored malt beverage would be Mike’s Hard Lemonade.
Kostov (2018) and Bostwick (2018) of the Wall Street Journal both describe how the decrease in sales of
macrobeer such as Bud Light as well as the rise in popularity of craft beer have prompted distributors to
reconsider their business models.
17 For detailed account of the hostile takeover of Anheuser-Busch, see Dethroning the King (Macintosh, 2011).
18
Anheuser-Busch was the first mover in this product space with Elk Mountain Ale in 1994, followed by Red
Wolf Lager brand that same year. Miller followed suit by introducing its Red Dog brand through Plank
Road Brewery, an in-house subsidiary of Miller that focused on craft beer products. The most successful of
these phantom brands was Blue Moon, developed by Coors in 1995. MillerCoors now sells over 2 million
barrels of Blue Moon per year. Blue Moon’s success prompted ABI’s 2006 release of its similarly marketed
brand Shock Top, which reached an annual production of 900,000 barrels in 2014.
16
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“Goose Island reached a unique place in the American craft beer industry. It was a rare hybrid,
serving local, national, and international audiences. It made beer for Chicago, it made beer for
stadiums and airport bars, and it was a brand to be exported to Europe and China, Australia
and South America. After all the scaling and tweaks, Goose IPA was essentially Anheuser-Busch
IPA. 312 was Anheuser-Busch Wheat Ale… All became tepid Big Beer reinventions of what they
had been when made in Chicago.” (Noel, p. 329)
Goose Island was a natural candidate for acquisition, ABI already had a minority stake in the
company, and it was consistently the second or third largest craft brewer in the six-state area in and
around Illinois each year from 2004-2009 leading up to the acquisition . In addition to purchasing stakes
in Spiked Seltzer, Virtue Cider, and the Craft Brew Alliance,19 ABI has since purchased nine other craft
breweries under its High End Brands subsidiary:
– Blue Point Brewing Co. (New York-based firm selling 60,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired
in 2014 for an estimated $24 million)
– 10 Barrel Brewing Co. (Oregon-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired
in 2014 for an undisclosed amount)
– Elysian Brewing (Washington-based firm selling 54,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired in
2015 for an undisclosed amount)
– Golden Road Brewing (California-based firm selling 45,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired
in 2015 for an undisclosed amount)
– Four Peaks Brewing Company (Arizona-based firm selling 70,000 barrels/year at time of purchase,
acquired in 2015 for an undisclosed amount)
– Breckenridge Brewery (Colorado-based firm selling 70,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired
in 2015 for an undisclosed amount)
– Devils Backbone Brewing Company (Virginia-based firm selling 60,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired in 2016 for an undisclosed amount)
– Karbach Brewing Company (Texas-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year at time of purchase, acquired in 2016 for an undisclosed amount)
– Wicked Weed Brewing (North Carolina-based firm selling 40,000 barrels/year at time of purchase,
acquired in 2017 for an undisclosed amount)

7 MillerCoors and the Craft Segment
Other macrobrewers have since made similar acquisitive forays into craft beer. MillerCoors acquired
Terrapin Beer Company in 2011, Crispin Cider in 2012, Saint Archer Brewing in 2015, and Revolver
Brewing and Hop Valley in 2016. Constellation, the American distributor of prominent Mexican beers
Corona and Modelo, acquired Ballast Point in 2015 and Funky Buddha in 2017. Additionally, Heineken
USA acquired a 50% share of Lagunitas in 2015 before purchasing the remaining share of the company
in 2017. This progression of acquisitions reveals the increased desire of Big Beer to cross the line between macrobrewed lagers and craft beer varieties to capitalize on the consumer demand for product
diﬀerentiation and to integrate acquired craft brewers into their established distribution channels.
8 A Case Study
To better understand the economic consequences of craft beer acquisitions by a macrobrewer, we examine
in detail the consequences of ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island. Goose Island is a worthy “representative
firm” (in Alfred Marshall’s use of the term). Goose Island was the largest craft brewer in Chicago at
the time of its acquisition; and it was acquired by the largest macrobrewer (ABI).20 The leading brand
of Goose Island was “312” which is the area code for Chicago. What makes our use of the acquisition
19 The Craft Brew Alliance is a brewing company consisting of five beer and cider brands: Redhook, Widmer
Brothers, Kona, Omission, and Square Mile Cider. CBA was founded in 2008 and then in 2013 sold a 32.2%
share of the business to ABI, which became the company’s distribution partner.
20 “[Goose Island] was an undeniably exciting place to work during an exciting time. The secret of variety,
choice, and innovation was out; everyone wanted a piece of craft beer. Breweries were opening at the rate of
one a day. Chicago had gone from one production brewery-Goose Island-to nearly a dozen. Goose Island was
in the midst of a sixteen-year run of winning twenty-five medals at the Great American Beer Festival-at least
once every year.” (Noel, p. 146)
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especially fitting (if not ironic) is that Goose Island 312 is now brewed at an ABI brewery in Baldwinsville,
New York (where the area code is 315).21
9 AB InBev Goose Island: The Competition Issue
Economic theory provides several possible strategic responses that could be the consequence of a major
brewer acquiring a craft brewer. Given the number of craft brewers, and the relative ease of entry into
the craft segment, it is plausible that craft brewery acquisitions would have no price eﬀect on craft beer.
Thus, if the market for craft beer were competitive, ABI would have no ability to raise the price of Goose
Island beer, and no incentive to lower its price. Under this scenario, there should be no antitrust concern.
If the acquiring firm can exploit scale economies in production or take advantage of distribution
economies in promoting the acquired brand to retail accounts, one would expect a decrease in the price
of Goose Island beer and expansion of volume and sales. If this is the case, the antitrust authorities
should applaud such acquisitions.
If ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island aﬀords ABI the ability to raise the price floor under craft beer by
raising the price points of its mainline products (e.g., Budweiser and Busch), then such an acquisition may
harm consumer welfare. Additionally, due to the regulatory characteristics of the three-tier system, ABI
could use its influence on distributors to foreclose the market to rivals in the craft beer segment. This
may diﬀerentially aﬀect states based on the legal regimes that govern their specific markets for alcoholic
beverages, as discussed in Burgdorf (2019). If either of these occur, such acquisitions merit the attention
of the antitrust authorities.
10 Data
We use Nielsen scanner data provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at the University
of Chicago Booth School of Business to explore whether there is evidence of foreclosure. Specifically,
we utilize the Retail Scanner Dataset to observe sales of beer at the month-store-product level. In the
Nielsen dataset, sales are recorded at the end of each week, and a volume-weighted price is reported,
though we aggregate up to the month level.22 We calculate both the total volume (in ounces) sold of
each beer in each store in addition to the total dollar amount of each beer sold in each store. We use
these to calculate the eﬀective price per ounce of each brand of beer (e.g., Goose Island 312) at each
store and total sales (total revenue) for each brand of beer at each store.
Due to sales promotions, stockpiling, and uneven consumption around occasions such as the Super
Bowl and the Fourth of July, sales may be choppy at the week level. By aggregating sales to the month in
which they were reported, we avoid the influence of outliers due to holiday or sporting event consumption
spikes and the pitfalls of having too many zeroes in our data. We also reduce the number of data points,
which allows us to expand the geographical scope of our sample and keep the computational burden of
the large size of the Nielsen dataset manageable.
Product characteristics such as brand, package-type, and volume also are included. We restrict our
sample to beer sold in six packs of 11.2 ounce or 12-ounce bottles.23 If diﬀerent pack sizes were included,
we would have to control for and explain the price diﬀerences due to quantity discounts.24 Additionally,
packs including more than six bottles of beer are often only sold by macrobrewers and large craft
brewers who have invested in the machinery to package larger pack sizes, creating a possible selection
issue. Furthermore, it is unlikely consumers are substituting from six packs to other multi-packs as they
do between six packs. By limiting our analysis to six packs, we move closer to an apples-to-apples instead
of oranges-to-apples comparison.
21

For a recent (“light” pun intended) account of ABI’s acquisition of Goose Island, see Noel (2018).
Beer sales are not evenly spaced across the week. Because of this, as well as for simplicity during data
aggregation, we count the whole week’s worth of sales in the month that sales are reported. For instance, if
sales are reported on the third of the month, the entire week of sales are recorded as having occurred in that
month.
23 Bottles that contain 11.2 ounces of beer hold one-third of a liter. European brewers and brewers that
follow the European tradition may use this size instead of the 12-ounce size Americans use. To the untrained
eye they are the same as those that hold 12 ounces of beer and are frequently placed next to each other in
stores and sold as if they had the same fill.
24 It is known that the major brewers engage in price discrimination as part of their competitive strategy but
we can find no precedent in the literature studying this to follow and leave analysis of price discrimination in the
beer industry to future research (Elzinga, 2016).
22
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For our results, we develop two samples based on brand information. The first contains all brands of
craft beer sold in the Nielsen dataset. Descriptive statistics for this sample are located for the premerger
time period in Table 3 and for the postmerger time period in Table 4. This sample was chosen to ascertain
if the merger had an eﬀect on craft brands in general, as has been feared by fans of the craft beer segment.
As mentioned earlier, most craft brewers produce very little beer, and most sell primarily through a
taproom or brewpub environment, or to on-premise accounts. Only the most successful brewers place
their beer in the channels observed in the Nielsen dataset. This sample attempts to discern the eﬀects of
the acquisition on these craft brewers. The second sample contains beers produced by macrobrewers.25
This sample was chosen to see if the acquisition allowed the macrobrewers to raise prices on their brands
through the alleviation of competitive pressure from the craft beer segment. Descriptive statistics for
this sample are located for the premerger time period in Table 5 and for the postmerger time period in
Table 6. From a market definition perspective, the brands in these two samples may be most likely to
suﬀer adverse consequences from an acquisition of a craft brewer by a macrobrewer.
When the two megabrewers acquire craft brewers, the antitrust authorities might be concerned that
independent craft brewers will be foreclosed from distribution. In our case study, the concern would be
that ABI will use the acquisition of Goose Island to foreclose other craft brewers. This can be investigated
by analyzing the first sample consisting of beers sold by craft brewers. If ABI has used Goose Island to
foreclose or weaken other craft brewers in the market, we would expect quantity sold to decrease. If ABI
has created a more eﬃcient rival in Goose Island, we would expect prices to decrease, and quantities to
either stay the same or increase, both procompetitive results.
A second concern is that the acquiring firm will absorb a craft brewer in order to alleviate the
competitive pressure on the acquirer’s own products. Here the concern would be that ABI will position
Goose Island’s pricing in a way that will induce substitution to the lager brands of the macrobrewers,
leading to sustained or increased prices of these products and growth in their volume. This can be
investigated by analyzing the second sample of beers produced by macrobrewers consisting of brands
from ABI, MillerCoors, Heineken, Pabst, and Constellation. If ABI is able to position Goose Island to
alleviate competitive pricing pressure on its mainstream brands, we should observe increased prices in
these brands or we should see substitution from craft beer to mainstream brands, resulting in increased
quantity sold.
Store characteristics also are included in this dataset; specifically, we identify the Designated Market
Area (DMA),26 channel type, state, three-digit zip code, FIPS county code, and FIPS state code.27 We
also identify diﬀerent retailers based on their store and corporate codes, though the true identity of each
particular retailer is shielded in the dataset.
In addition to this information from Nielsen, we also add control variables for income, education,
alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized
brewpubs. We control for these because each of these measures is correlated with consumption of beer,
and craft beer in particular.
Due to computational limitations, we apply several restrictions to our dataset. First, we limit our
dataset geographically to Midwestern and mid-Atlantic states that are proximate to Goose Islands focal
point of Chicago and would be the part of the country most likely to experience the eﬀects, if any, of
an aggressive expansion of Goose Island sales under the patronage of ABI. The territory we examine
includes Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. We further limit our
dataset only to beers sold between 2010 and 2013. This gives us both a pre- and post-period for the
acquisition of Goose Island by ABI.28 The result is over four million observations at the brand-storemonth level in the craft beer sample and over six million observations in the macrobrewer sample. Using
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework, we examine the eﬀect of the merger on volume and pricing of craft
beers and macro lagers.
11 Estimation Approach
Recall that the primary concern of competitors of Goose Island in the craft beer segment is that ABI will
exploit distributor relationships to induce substitution towards Goose Island and away from “true craft”
25

We include all beers sold by ABI, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst.
These regions are determined by Nielsen based upon the regional reach of metro area commercial TV
channels.
27 FIPS codes, or Federal Information Processing Standards, are five-digit codes that uniquely identify counties
or county-equivalent jurisdictions in the United States.
28 The acquisition occurred on March 28, 2011.
26
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beers. If this is true, the potential eﬀect of the merger should be stronger in stores and markets where
ABI has a greater share of market and thus has more influence over their distributors. The National Beer
Wholesalers Association (2016) expressed its concern that ABI
“encourages distributors to drop rival beers and replace it with an ABI owned “craft” to replace
any lost sales. ABI may threaten the ability of a distributor to transfer its business. The pressure
to drop rival beers does not end there. ABI executives have frequently visited distributors that
choose to sell non-ABI products to encourage them otherwise, and publicly criticize distributors
that carry non-ABI brands at trade meetings.”
To address this, we would like to know the actual share of revenue or profits generated by ABI for each
of its distributors in each of its retail stores. Unfortunately, that information is not publicly available.
However, Nielsen data do allow us to find the market share at the store-month level captured by ABI
products.
The variable ABI Market Share is defined as the premerger market share (determined by revenue)
of AB InBev branded products for a particular store. We implement our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model
with this as our “treatment” or comparison variable, making this akin to an intent to treat specification.
We adopt this because the economic concern of the merger is that AB InBev will use its market power
to foreclose other craft brewers, or use its portfolio, now including Goose Island, to move pricing in such
a way as to alleviate pressure on its mainline brands and portfolio in general. We expect that stores
having significant sales of ABI brands in the premerger period should be more aﬀected than stores whose
revenue is largely sourced from other firms due to the influence of the distribution tier on oﬀ-premise
sales. This specification also allows us to drill into the eﬀects of the merger at the store level.
The Goose Island acquisition was announced on March 28, 2011, and we use this date to demarcate the
premerger and postmerger time periods.29 Our standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered
at the store level in all models.30 We implement a fixed-eﬀects model at the product-store level, which
should control for time-invariant diﬀerences in individual stores’ pricing strategies of individual brands.
We model our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework with five separate specifications and three outcome
variables of interest. Our first specification regresses each dependent variable against a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 for the post-acquisition time period (Post), the ABI Market Share variable, and an
interaction term of these two variables (Post x ABI Market Share). Commensurate with the typical
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, this interaction term is the variable of interest. If our estimates are
causal, the coeﬃcient on this term will reveal the positive or negative impact of the acquisition on each
of the dependent variables of interest. We implement several improvements over the nave regression of
our first specification.
Our second specification adds yearly time eﬀects and our third specification adds year and DMA
(Designated Market Area) interactions to the yearly time eﬀects of our second specification.31 Our
fourth specification adds year and retailer interactions to both the yearly eﬀects and the year and DMA
interactions.32 Our fifth, final, and preferred specification adds the control variables mentioned above to
the fixed eﬀects in the fourth specification.
The fifth specification is preferable for several reasons. First, it includes yearly time fixed eﬀects to
control for the significant growth of the craft beer industry over this period. Second, it includes year and
Designated Market Area interaction terms. Craft beer demand and growth has a distinct geographical
profile. They are concentrated in certain areas, and both are heterogeneous across areas and time. These
interactions control for this. We include year and retailer interactions because, within the beer industry,
there are distinct diﬀerences across channels in terms of breadth of oﬀerings and types of beer sold.
Typically, selection is wider at liquor stores than supermarkets, where selection is wider than convenience
stores. That said, within these channels there also is variation in the selection of beers oﬀered.
Retailers such as Walmart have a diﬀerent inventory portfolio than Target, just as Whole Foods will
oﬀer diﬀerent brands and package sizes than Kroger.33 However, due to the three-tier system, retailers
may interact with distributors at a higher level than the individual store. This approach captures more
heterogeneity than the typical channel-level analysis, but also takes into account the idiosyncrasies of
the three-tier system. Moreover, by including the time interaction, we allow these effects to fluctuate as
the craft beer landscape evolves and as retailers respond.
29

The postmerger time period begins in April of 2011 and the premerger time period ends in March of 2011.
Note this is individual store level, not retailer level.
31 We do not include month and DMA interactions due to computational restrictions.
32 We do not include month and retailer interactions due to computational restrictions.
33 In the Nielsen dataset, because retailers names are masked, our results do not imply anything concerning
these specific stores.
30
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Finally, we include the battery of demographic controls (income, education, alcohol consumption, and
year of brewpub legalization) to control for state level factors that may aﬀect consumption patterns of
craft beer. We choose to do this at the state level because we are unable to disaggregate available data
to the DMA level. We apply these five specifications to our triple-diﬀerence framework as well.
This results in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model that has the following specification:
log(priceijkmt ) = β0 + β1 P ostt + β2ABI Market Sharek +
β 3 P ost ∗ ABI Market Sharekt + β 4Xijkt+
τt + γmt + αkt + δijkm + ijkmt

(1)

That is, we regress the log of price (or quantity) of a particular brand of beer (i) sold in a particular
store (j) that belongs to a particular retailer (k) in a particular DMA (m) at a particular time (t) against
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences variables and a battery of controls and fixed eﬀects.
We study three outcome variables of interest: (1) the log of price per ounce; (2) log of total sales; and
(3) the number of competing brands sold in the store. The first two outcome variables are conventional
variables in merger retrospectives. We wish to know if price has decreased, commensurate with eﬃciencies
dominating merger related eﬀects, or if price has increased, commensurate with coordination dominating
merger related eﬀects. Similarly, increasing total sales at the brand-store level may be indicative of a
procompetitive merger and decreasing total sales may be indicative of an anticompetitive merger, such
as would occur if AB InBev foreclosed other craft brewers from the market.
The craft beer segment competes for consumer patronage more through product diﬀerentiation than
by price. Consumer welfare is a function not only of price but also quality. For this reason, we include
a measure of the number of brands that compete within a store, to attempt to identify the eﬀect of the
acquisition on one quality metric, product variety. For each craft beer product, we calculate the number
of distinct types of craft beers that are sold in the relevant store-month in the sample of craft beer and
for each macro beer product we calculate the number of distinct types of macro beers that are sold in
the relevant store-month for the sample of macro beers.
12 Results: Craft Beer Sample
We find no impact on the price of craft beer due to the acquisition of Goose Island by ABI. Results are in
Table 9. This implies that while the acquisition did not have an anti-competitive eﬀect on consumers from
a rise in price of craft beer, there is also not evidence that the eﬃciency gains from ABI’s superior
technology and production capability were passed on to consumers of craft beer through aggressive price
competition. We do find statistically significant evidence that the volume of sales of craft beer increased
postmerger in stores that had larger market share premerger of ABI products. This implies that the
amount of craft beer sold per week has increased in those stores that may have been more likely to be
aﬀected by the acquisition, perhaps as a result of aggressive marketing of Goose Island by ABI that may
have spilled over to other brands. Results are located in Table 11. However, results on the impact of the
acquisition on the number of craft beer brands sold, shown in Table 13, indicates that the number of craft
beer brands has decreased in these stores, as we found statistically significant and negative eﬀects on
the number of competing craft beer brands sold in stores postmerger with a greater share of premerger
ABI revenue. Together this is interesting, while there seems to be some confirmation of craft brewers’
fear of being foreclosed on entering stores where ABI has a larger market share, conditional on gaining
shelf space in these stores, the acquisition of Goose Island appears to be a boon to craft brewers.
13 Results: Macro Beer Sample
In terms of movement within macro beers, we find statistically significant evidence of postmerger increases
in price of macro beer products in stores with larger premerger ABI market share, but statistically
significant evidence of sales decreases for these products. Results are in Table 15 and Table 17. That
these are opposite in direction show that while macrobrewers may have tried to jockey their products to a
higher price point with the new portfolio of craft beer, sales levels were not maintained and it is unlikely
this was profitable. This is mixed evidence towards macro brewers taking advantage of oligopoly power
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in these markets. In terms of number of competing macro beer brands, we find no statistical evidence of
change postmerger, and show our results in Table 19.
14 Results: Goose Island Sample
Crucially, we would like to know the impact of the acquisition on sales of Goose Island beer itself. We
investigate this by looking at a subsample of our craft beer sample consisting of only Goose Island
brands. If the acquisition resulted in increased access and consumption of Goose Island it would be a
boon to consumers, as would any price decreases passed through from eﬃciency gains made as a result
of the acquisition. We first look at price eﬀects and find that ABI maintained prices and did not pass
through any achieved eﬃciencies to consumers, evidenced by no statistical change in price. Results are
located in Table 21. Second, we look at sales. If ABI was aggressive in marketing Goose Island we would
expect increases in sales of the brand. We cannot conclude the coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
interaction term is statistically significant but do observe positive coeﬃcients on our regression of sales of
some magnitude, providing weak evidence of an expansion of Goose Island sales after the ABI acquisition,
as expected.
15 Regional Analysis: Illinois
It has become apparent that ABI’s acquisitions have a distinct regional flavor to them. Each of the
ten acquisitions is at the heart of a state or metro area that has seen tremendous growth in the craft
segment. For that reason, a natural question is whether or not there are diﬀerent eﬀects in the regions
these craft brewers are located compared to broader geographic areas. We first analyze the eﬀect on craft
beer sold in Illinois. Results are located in Table 25. We find much larger eﬀects on sales and price than
our more general analysis, for sales we find an eﬀect almost five times that estimated in our more general
sample as well as larger and statistically significant eﬀects on price compared to that estimated in the
more general sample. We find a negative eﬀect on the number of brands of craft beer sold in individual
stores more than twice that of our more general sample. It is clear that there have been much larger
merger-related eﬀects in the market for craft beer in Goose Island’s home state of Illinois than elsewhere.
This contrasts with our estimates from our macro beer sample in Illinois, which are located in Table 27.
These coeﬃcient estimates are similar for price and sales eﬀects but larger, negative, and significant when
analyzing the variety of brands of macro beer sold in stores compared to our more general geographic
sample. Finally, we analyzed the impact on sales and price of Goose Island in Illinois, finding no impact
on price but large, positive impacts on sales after the acquisition of Goose Island ten times that of the
estimates from the more general sample. Results are located in Table 29. Together it appears that ABI
has greatly expanded sales of Goose Island in Illinois at the expense of many smaller craft breweries.
16 Channel Level Analysis
We next analyze whether or not the acquisition had heterogeneous eﬀects across diﬀerent channel types.
The Nielsen database allows us to observe whether each product was sold in a convenience store, drug
store, food (grocery) store, or mass merchandiser. The exact identity of each of the retailers is hidden
and unknown to us. We re-analyze the price, sales, and product variety eﬀects in our macro, craft, and
Goose Island samples by breaking the data into sub-samples for each of these four types of stores. Results
are in Tables 31-45. We observe several interesting findings. First, we observe that increases in sales of
craft beer are driven by stores in the convenience, drug, and mass merchandiser channels and not in
grocery stores. We find large positive coeﬃcients in these channels that range between roughly two and
four times the magnitude observed in our full sample, and a smaller and statistically insignificant
estimate on the interaction term in the grocery channel. This lends credence to the theory that ABI is
spurring sales of craft beer in these channels where there is less variety of choice. Conditional on Goose
Island being available on the shelf, ABI may drive more traﬃc to its own product option. Second, the
loss of sales in macro beers are driven by drug stores but no meaningful loss is observed among mass
merchandisers. This may be an artifact of our sample excluding non six-pack package sizes, as these two
channels sell mainly very large or very small (single) packages of beer. Nonetheless, while estimates are
generally in line with those of the full sample for convenience and grocery stores, drug stores observe
an eﬀect more than double the magnitude observed in the full sample. Finally, we observe weak price
decrease in price of Goose Island beer in grocery stores as in the full sample, but large and positive
increases in price in mass merchandise stores, suggesting that craft beer may be earning a premium in

Has Anheuser-Busch Let the Steam Out of Craft Beer? The Economics of Acquiring Craft Brewers

11

these channels.
17 Conclusion
One swallow does not make a Spring and one case study of an acquisition does not prove a proposition.
Nonetheless, in watching for Spring we do look for swallows. For that reason, the ABI-Goose Island
acquisition is a fitting case study of the economic consequences of combining a megabrewer with a
prominent craft brewer.34 To the extent this case study is a harbinger of others, however, the standard
price-quantity consequences studied in merger retrospectives of the ABI-Goose Island combination fail
to confirm the fears that many had that the acquisition of Goose Island by ABI would hamper other
craft brewers and consumers.
If the ABI-Goose Island amalgamation is a reflection of other such combinations, present and future,
our study suggests that beer drinkers are not worse oﬀ in terms of the usual consumer welfare metrics
of price and output. To the extent consumers value the Brandeisian merits of small business and derive utility from the purchasing the product of locally owned firms, the acquisition of craft brewers by
megabrewers reduces the choice set of (true) craft beers with these attributes. Fortunately, through the
rapid rise of on-premise outlets, the increasing supply of new entrants in the craft segment comes at a
more rapid rate than the current propensity of megabrewers to acquire them or foreclose them from shelf
space in oﬀ-premise accounts.

34
It is the one such acquisition to merit a book length treatment (Noel, 2018) whose author also
extrapolates the lesson of this combination to the craft segment as a whole.
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Table 1: Beer Sales by Segment in the US
Market Share
2018 17.4
12.4
7.9
4.5
0.9
43.2
7.7
28.2
35.9
10.0
8.5
2.1
20.6

Imports
Craft
Superpremium
Cider
High End
Premium Regular
Premium Light
Premium
Subpremium
Regular
Subpremium
Light
Malt Liquor
Subpremium
No Alcohol

Market Share 2013
13.3
7.8
6.9
3.7
0.6
32.4
9.7
33.8
43.6
11.5
9.6
2.6
23.7

Table 2: *
Source: Beer Marketer’s Insights

Table 3: Beer Sales by Segment in the US
Brand
Corona Extra
Modelo
Especial
Heineken
Stella Artois
Dos Equis
Corona Light
Guinness
Corona
Familiar
Pacifico
Tecate
Top 10 Brands
Others
Total Imports

Bbls 2018
8,580
8,180
3,800
2,675
1,900
1,125
1,110
730
725
680
29,505
6,495
36,000

Market Share
2018 23.8
22.7
10.6
7.4
5.3
3.1
3.1
2.0
2.0
1.9
82.0
18.0
100.0

Bbls 2008
7,940
1,810
4,950
755
725
925
980
360
1,515
19,960
8,929
28,889

Table 4: *
Source: Beer Marketer’s Insights

Table 5: Premerger Summary Statistics, Craft Beer Sample
Six Pack Price
Six Pack Sold
Total Sales
Goose Island Sold in Store-week
ABI Market Share
brewpub legalization year
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and
overCapita Income (chained 2012 dollars)
Per
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine
Per capita ethanol consumption from
spiritsBrands Sold
Total
Craft Beer Brands Sold
Observations

Number of Brands Sold in Store

mean
8.192643
9.121971
72.78735
.5444173
.2284364
1987.113
28.04414
48884.35
1.214892
.3279882
.7020477
112.1514
44.37833
1111201

sd
min
1.348875
.01
17.46063
1
148.2007
.01
.4980234
0
.1168051
0
2.356039 1985
4.72663
17.5
5264.827 36910
.1500962
.89
.1025704
.1
.1911048
.44
57.30957
1
33.17063
1

max
24
1698
15858.57
1
.9860957
1993
36.9
66706
1.49
.66
1.36
331
189
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Table 6: Postmerger Summary Statistics, Craft Beer Sample
mean
sd
min
Six Pack Price
Six Pack Sold
Total Sales
Goose Island Sold in Store-week
ABI Market Share
Brewpub Legalization Year
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and
overCapita Income (chained 2012 dollars)
Per
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine
Per capita ethanol consumption from
spiritsBrands Sold
Total
Craft Beer Brands Sold
Observations

8.672829
9.276056
78.15854
.7156956
.2289627
1987.084
29.02666
49900.8
2
1.176728
.3541886
.72547
130.2513
64.28937
3479193

1.44457
.01
20.14404 .9333333
188.9804
.01
.4510826
0
.1312322
0
2.271642
1985
4.644906
18.5
4875.026
37405
.1455296
.84
.0947028
.1
.1909979
.46
67.95475
1
46.12406
1

Table 7: Premerger Summary Statistics, Macro Beer Sample
mean
sd
min
Six Pack Price
Six Pack Sold
Total Sales
Goose Island Sold in Store-week
ABI Market Share
Brewpub Legalization Year
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and
overCapita Income (chained 2012 dollars)
Per
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine
Per capita ethanol consumption from
spirits
Total Brands Sold
Macro Beer Brands Sold
Observations

6.433155
12.10633
75.21994
.3956651
.3054471
1987.449
27.85404
48445.99
1.192587
.3266767
.7004236
79.26268
38.58319
1953498

1.355273
.01
15.37041 .9333333
93.34719
.01
.4889932
0
.1716414
0
2.627596
1985
4.887537
17.5
5686.22
36910
.1455707
.89
.1031089
.1
.178198
.44
51.63728
1
17.03259
1

Table 8: Postmerger Summary Statistics, Macro Beer Sample
mean
sd
min
Six Pack Price
Six Pack Sold
Total Sales
Goose Island Sold in Store-week
ABI Market Share
Brewpub Legalization Year
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher, 25 and
overCapita Income (chained 2012 dollars)
Per
Per capita ethanol consumption from beer
Per capita ethanol consumption from wine
Per capita ethanol consumption from
spiritsBrands Sold
Total
Macro Beer Brands Sold
Observations

6.884017
12.17785
81.92596
.5219289
.2982102
1987.412
28.82931
49369.57
1.159184
.3516101
.7353005
89.16157
37.19947
4127748

1.339058
15.22255
103.0672
.499519
.1720245
2.579948
4.909575
5386.312
.1469885
.1004513
.1877256
61.40486
16.65444

.01
.9333333
.01
0
0
1985
18.5
37405
.84
.1
.46
1
1

max
65.94
2663
31929.37
1
1
1993
37.4
68310
1.46
.72
1.63
404
267

max
20
1671
8672.49
1
1
1993
36.9
68310
1.49
.69
1.52
331
86

max
119.615
1472
9936
1
1
1993
37.4
68310
1.46
.72
1.63
404
84

Table 9: Fixed Eﬀects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Price)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls

0.0290∗∗∗
(0.00328)
)4589530

0.0303∗∗∗
(0.00330)
4589530
Y

0.00560
0.000951 0.000025
(0.00355) (0.00316) 1(0.00312)
4589530
4589530
4589530
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 10: *
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes all
craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, D.C.,
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 11: Fixed Eﬀects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Sales)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Post × ABI Market Share

0.112∗∗∗
(0.0226)
4590394

0.107∗∗∗
0.104∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0242)
4590394 4590394
Y
Y
Y

Observations
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions
Demographic Controls
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

0.111∗∗∗
0.108∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0249)
4590394 4590394
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 12: *
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample
includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington,
D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in
packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions
are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions
are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set).
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the stateyear level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 13: Fixed Eﬀects Model (D-i-D), Craft Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Number of Brands Sold in
Store)
(1)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls

(2)

0.0186 ∗
-45.54∗∗∗
(0.00935)
(3.173)
4590394
4590394
Y

(3)

(4)

(5)

-40.59∗∗∗
(2.846)
4590394
Y
Y

-29.88∗∗∗
(2.908)
4590394
Y
Y
Y

-29.63∗∗∗
(2.886)
4590394
Y
Y
Y
Y

Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 14: *
Dependent variable is the number of craft beer brands sold in a particular store. Sample includes all craft beer
sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, D.C., Delaware,
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six
are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are
interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are
interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set).
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the stateyear level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 15: Fixed Eﬀects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Price)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls

0.0639∗∗∗
(0.00259)
6080662

0.0652∗∗∗
(0.00259)
6080662
Y

0.0423∗∗∗
0.0294∗∗∗
0.0296∗∗∗
(0.00247) (0.00236) (0.00238)
6080662
6080662
6080662
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 16: *
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes
macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., Delaware,
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six
are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are
interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are
interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set).
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the stateyear level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 17: Fixed Eﬀects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Sales)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Post × ABI Market Share

-0.00938
(0.0111)
6081246

-0.0117
(0.0110)
6081246
Y

Observations
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

-0.0571∗∗∗
(0.0119)
6081246
Y
Y

-0.0799∗∗∗
(0.0119)
6081246
Y
Y
Y

-0.0808∗∗∗
(0.0119)
6081246
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 18: *
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample
includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C.,
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 19: Fixed Eﬀects Model (D-i-D), Macro Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Number of Brands
Sold in Store)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls

-1.874∗∗∗
(0.278)
6081246

-1.836∗∗∗
(0.277)
6081246
Y

0.287
(0.303)
6081246
Y
Y

-0.344
(0.280)
6081246
Y
Y
Y

-0.303
(0.282)
6081246
Y
Y
Y
Y

Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 20: *
Dependent variable is the number of macro beer brands sold in a particular store. Sample includes macro
beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included
in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions
between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions
between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls
include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the
year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 21: Fixed Eﬀects Model (D-i-D), Goose Island Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Price)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.107∗∗∗
-0.0345∗∗∗
-0.00720
-0.0125
(0.00990) (0.00956) (0.00874) (0.00836)
Observations
187877
187877
187877
187877
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Y
Y
Y
Y
Time × DMA Interactions?
Y
Y
Y
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Y
Y
Demographic Controls
Y
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Post × ABI Market Share

-0.107∗∗∗
(0.00990)
187877

Table 22: *
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes beer
produced by Goose Island in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and
2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables
at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated
Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of
retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption
from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 23: Fixed Eﬀects Model (D-i-D), Goose Island Beer Sample (Dependent Variable = Log of Sales)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Post × ABI Market Share

0.422∗∗∗
(0.0818)
187877

0.427∗∗∗
(0.0823)
187877
Y

Observations
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

0.188 ∗
(0.0882)
187877
Y
Y

0.0609
0.0607
(0.0885) (0.0880)
187877
187877
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 24: *
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample
includes beer produced by Goose Island in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West
Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time
eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen
defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen
retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education,
and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized
brewpubs.

Table 25: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Craft Beer Sold in Illinois
(1)
(2)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Dependent Variable?
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls

0.475∗∗∗
(0.134)
586839
Log of Sales
Y
Y
Y
Y

0.0348 ∗∗
(0.0121)
586787
Log of Price
Y
Y
Y
Y

(3)

-80.62∗∗∗
(13.76)
586839
Number of Brands
Y
Y
Y
Y

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 26: *
Sample includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in
Illinois between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects
are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined
DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer
id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol
consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 27: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Macro Beer Sold in Illinois
(1)
(2)
(3)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Dependent Variable?
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

0.0630
(0.0651)
706790
Log of Sales
Y
Y
Y
Y

-0.00563
(0.00611)
706633
Log of Price
Y
Y
Y
Y

-5.757∗∗∗
(0.889)
706790
Number of Brands
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 28: *
Sample includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Illinois
between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are
dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined
DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer
id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol
consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 29: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Goose Island Beer Sold in Illinois
(1)
(2)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Dependent Variable?
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

0.603∗
(0.303)
66616
Log of Sales
Y
Y
Y
Y

-0.01000
(0.0220)
66616
Log of Price
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 30: *
Sample includes beer produced by Goose Island in Illinois between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer
sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at
the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 31: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of Price)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Store Type
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

0.00987
0.0214
(0.0112)
(0.0128)
48085
301425
Convenience
Drug
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

-0.00678∗ -0.0124
(0.00312 (0.0146)
)4067326
173558
Food
Mass
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 32: *
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes all
craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, D.C.,
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 33: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of Sales)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Store Type
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

0.391∗∗
0.187∗∗∗
0.0602
0.255∗∗
(0.142)
(0.0474) (0.0330) (0.0834)
48085
301425
4067326 173558
Convenience
Drug
Food
Mass
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 34: *
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample
includes all craft beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington,
D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in
packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions
are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions
are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set).
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the stateyear level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 35: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Craft Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Number of Brands Sold
in Store)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-1.155
-7.630∗∗
(1.785)
(2.456)
48085
301425
Convenience
Drug
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Store Type
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls

-36.06∗∗∗
(4.037)
4067326
Food
Y
Y
Y
Y

-2.369
(2.376)
173558
Mass
Y
Y
Y
Y

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 36: *
Dependent variable is the number of macro beer brands sold in a particular store. Sample includes all craft
beer sold by brewers meeting the Brewers Association definition of a craft brewer in Washington, D.C.,
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 37: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of Price)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Store Type
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls

0.0641∗∗∗
0.0326∗∗∗
(0.00608) (0.00869)
267473
896323
Convenience
Drug
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

0.0308∗∗∗
(0.00267)
4483428
Food
Y
Y
Y
Y

0.0141 ∗
(0.00639)
434022
Mass
Y
Y
Y
Y

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 38: *
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes
macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., Delaware,
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six
are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are
interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are
interactions between year and Nielsen retailer i d (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set).
Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the stateyear level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 39: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of Sales)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Store Type
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

-0.0607
-0.193∗∗∗
-0.0683∗∗∗
(0.0615)
(0.0298)
(0.0168)
267473
896323
4483428
Convenience
Drug
Food
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

0.0106
(0.0414)
434022
Mass
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 40: *
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample
includes macro beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C.,
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold
in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer
interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data
set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the
state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.
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Table 41: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Macro Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Number of Brands Sold
in Store)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post × ABI Market Share

-0.985
0.130
-0.311
0.780
(0.905)
(0.326) (0.430) (0.651)
267473
896323 4483428 434022
Convenience Drug
Food
Mass
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Observations
Store Type
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table 42: *
Dependent variable is the number of macro beer brands sold in a particular store. Sample includes macro
beer sold by AB InBev, Constellation, MillerCoors, Heineken, and Pabst in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included
in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions
between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions
between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls
include income, education, and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the
year the state legalized brewpubs.
Table 43: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Goose Island Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of
Price)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Store Type
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

0.00354
0.0202
(0.00770)
(0.0344)
3677
13349
Convenience
Drug
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

-0.0272∗∗
(0.0103)
158450
Food
Y
Y
Y
Y

0.0984 ∗
(0.0447)
12401
Mass
Y
Y
Y
Y

Table 44: *
Dependent variable is the log of price per ounce of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample includes beer
produced by Goose Island in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia between 2010 and
2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time eﬀects are dummy variables
at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen defined DMAs (Designated
Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen retailer id (the identity of
retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education, and alcohol consumption
from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized brewpubs.

Table 45: Fixed Eﬀects Model, Goose Island Beer Channel Sub-analysis (Dependent variable = Log of
Sales)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post × ABI Market Share
Observations
Store Type
Time Fixed Eﬀects?
Time × DMA Interactions?
Time × Retailer Interactions?
Demographic Controls

-0.105
0.124
0.0973
(0.343)
(0.305) (0.113)
3677
13349
158450
Convenience Drug
Food
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

-0.0411
(0.227)
12401
Mass
Y
Y
Y
Y

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 46: *
Dependent variable is the log of sales (in total dollars sold) of a particular beer in a particular store. Sample
includes beer produced by Goose Island in Washington, D.C., Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West
Virginia between 2010 and 2013. Only 12 oz or 11.2 oz beer sold in packs of six are included in the sample. Time
eﬀects are dummy variables at the year level. Time x DMA interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen
defined DMAs (Designated Market Area). Time x Retailer interactions are interactions between year and Nielsen
retailer id (the identity of retailers is hidden in the data set). Demographic controls include income, education,
and alcohol consumption from beer, wine, and spirits at the state-year level, and the year the state legalized
brewpubs.

